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A bstract:
A difficult reality for international affairs specialists to face is that, despite solid effort and 
reams o f research over the years, few real gains have been in made in understanding or 
predicting world events. Narrative research in international affairs has been criticized for 
failing to solidly prove causality. Positivist research is progressing to better quantify 
political data and show causality, but it deals poorly with subjective information. The 
problem with international events is that they contain an enormous number o f complex 
variables, many o f which we have little idea how to measure. To address these problems, 
researchers narrow the focus of their study to control the immense number and complexity 
o f their variables. The quantification of complex social events, however, inevitably leads 
to a skewed vision o f the world from which little can be learned. Furthermore, if usable 
data begins to dictate the research, an accurate picture o f the world is lost.- As a result of 
these difficulties, researchers have sometimes ended up placing misguided attention on 
certain kinds of variables and have consequently failed to understand some world events 
when they do not relate to these particular variables. Additionally, political science has 
become so widely diversified that researchers find it hard to understand one another and to 
see events from the broadest perspective. Suggested here is a six category system to help 
recognize and order data from a political event. This system recognizes actors, actor 
preferences, actor assets and liabilities, actor behavior, actor relationships, and game 
outcomes. This system helps expand the database to include previously marginalized 
actors, and can suggest a common epistemological starting point for research, theory- 
making, and dialog among political scientists. Employing this ordering of event 
information should help researchers get a better overall picture of a political event from 
which they can better select variables for research and better construct experiments and 
theories. Well-known examples drawn from various international relations issues will be 
used to help illustrate how this categorization process works.
Part I - Introduction
International relations theory has led a difficult existence as a social science. 
Arguably the most noble of disciplines whose major intent, among others, has been the 
prevention o f wars has never come close to such an ideal, nor has it been able to 
coherently explain such conflicts when they happen. Just when a generation o f political 
scientists was beginning to grasp and sometimes even manage a bi-polar world, the Cold 
War ended, collapsing this structure and rendering it nearly as irrelevant as ‘Checkpoint 
Charlie’ now is in Berlin. The challenge facing international relations experts involves not 
only the observation and reporting of international events, but the understanding and 
management of them as well. The cause of these, so far, insurmountable difficulties is the 
highly complex nature of human political interaction. Our means of studying political 
phenomena needs improvement in order to begin to answer the questions that we have set 
out to ask.
Research in international relations has been conducted in a number o f ways over 
time from Thucydides’ descriptive account o f the Peloponnesian War, to the prescriptive 
writing o f Immanuel Kant, to the analytical writing of Hans Morgenthau.1/2 As insightful 
and elucidating as these approaches are, they do little for those practicing public policy
!In Immanuel Kant's Fundamental Principles o f the Metaphvsic o f Morals, his discussion of rational knowledge, reason, 
morals, and the Categorical Imperative create a means by which moral human behavior may be prescribed.
2Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations describes a considerable number of historical events from which he draws 
general conclusions and generates his theory of power. This goes beyond Thucydides' story-like retelling o f political events 
involving little universalizable analysis.
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who need real guidance on what to do in real-life situations. Furthermore, lacking in all of 
these efforts is a truly causal theory which can be used to explain or predict how 
international events happen. Working to address this void, the positivist trend which 
swept through all social sciences has touched international relations as well. The 
understandable desire to generate empirically provable theory attracts researchers to the 
scientifically-oriented quantitative approach. Authors such as J. David Singer and Bruce 
Bueno De Mesquita helped introduce international relations to the quantification of human 
and state interaction.3 / 4 This positivist approach now commands the field despite a still 
limited ability to clearly instruct policy-makers on. what to do, or adequately predict 
political events.5
International relations theory is faced, therefore, with two overall approaches; 
narrative, and positivist. The two are different in outlook and process, and, not 
surprisingly, the two beget different products. The narrative approach has the ability to 
describe and document a lot, but it usually proves little. The positivist approach is 
scientifically verifiable, but it requires a more narrow range of focus.6 Understandably, 
political scientists are reluctant to relinquish their capability to thoroughly chronicle 
political life in the way they see most fitting for an event, but they recognize the need, like
3J. David Singer, ed., The Correlates o f War: I Research Origins and Rationale (New York: The Free Press, 1979)
4Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981)
5Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The Benefits of a Social-Scientific Approach to Studying International Affairs " in Explaining 
International Relations Since 1945 , ed. Ngaire Woods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 69.
6David A. Bositis, Research Designs for Political Science: Contrivance and Demonstration in Theory and Practice 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 12.
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all scientists, to be able to prove something from their work. These methodological 
limitations create their own problems. The ideal situation would be to assist both o f these 
two approaches in a way that their respective benefits may be exploited and their pitfalls 
avoided. Suggested here is a means o f arranging all event data using the rational actor 
theoretical structure which will enable categorization o f political events and information. 
With a new means of organizing data from a political event, researchers can more easily 
observe and select variables for further qualitative or quantitative, narrative or positive, 
normative or empirical study. At the same time, they will also be forced to make more 
informed and considered choices when selecting their research variables.
In the quest for simplicity in research and theory-building, much is lost. John 
Lewis Gaddis notes that political scientists, "know that if they do not impose such 
exclusions and controls, complications will quickly overwhelm their calculations, and 
predictability will suffer."7 This problem is very serious and carries major implications for 
the study of international relations theory. Historically under-represented actors such as 
women and the poor are ignored by researchers concentrating on issues they feel are more 
important like the Super Power conflict. Cynthia Enloe sees a serious problem in this 
research strategy which presumes those at the "margins, silences and bottom rungs" of 
political life cannot possibly have significance in world affairs.8 Enloe observes that
7(John Lewis Gaddis 1992/1993, 55)
8Cynthia Enloe, "Margins, silences and bottom rungs: how to overcome the underestimation of power in the study of 
international relations," In International Theory: Positivism & Bevond. Edited by Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia 
Zalewski (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 188.
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political scientist’s ignore the tremendous amount o f power which is exerted to keep those 
at the margins from moving to the center of the political arena. Failing to recognize this 
means ignoring a major part of the story.9 Ted Hopf supports Enloe's point when he looks 
at international relations researchers response to the end o f the cold war. What political 
research that was being done in this area was fine. The problem, however, lay in what was 
not being done. There were various elements of political life researchers undervalued in 
the overall U.S./Soviet picture. These overlooked areas, such as low-level domestic 
sources o f economic and political discontent, ended up being the leading cause o f the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. Had we been forced to look at the bigger picture o f what 
was happening in the Soviet Union in the 1980's, we might not have been so surprised 
when communism suddenly fell.10 Researchers in their singular concentration on whatever 
issues were popularly deemed most relevant, never considered the numerous internal 
pressures present within the Soviet Union as worthy topics of engagement during the Cold 
War. All o f this underscores the fact that international relations researchers need a better 
way of systematically looking at the whole story to recognize what is really happening. 
Marysia Zalewski states, "We need to re-think the discipline in ways that will disturb the 
existing boundaries of both what we claim to be relevant in international politics and what 
we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world."11
9(Cynthia Enloe 1996, 188)
10Ted Hopf, "Getting the End of the Cold War Wrong," International Security. VOL 18, NO. 2 (Fall 1993): 202.
“Marysia Zalewski, "'All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up': theories, theorists, theorizing," in International 
Theory: Positivism and Bevond. ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, & Marysia Zalewski (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 352.
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Part II - Literature Review
Some see international relations theory to be nearly in the midst of a new 
renascence.12 Since World War II, international relations theory experienced few 
significant philosophical or practical challenges until the trend toward quantification o f 
social events became the newest approach in social science research during the 1950's.
This challenge, and the conflicts and confusion around this new approach has become 
known as the, so called, 'Second Debate.' Thirty years later, with little progress toward 
the resolution o f that debate, a newer, though similar, dilemma has arisen. The 'Third 
Debate' opens up international relations theory to accommodate a greater variety of 
epistemological approaches. The historical research versus scientific method debate has 
never been adequately resolved as quantitative research methods permeate the social 
sciences; recent efforts by political scientists who have brought in critical theory, 
linguistic criticism, feminism, and third world perspectives have opened up political 
science to the most considered and widest range o f theoretical dialog to date. O f course, 
the result is an impassioned and all-encompassing dialog which, in itself, is under debate as 
either strengthening and enriching the discipline or wasting everyone's time.13
As a starting point, political scientists appear to agree that the goal o f their work is
12Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positive Era," International Studies 
Quarterly VOL. 33, NO. 3 (September 1989): 250.
13K. J. Holsti, "Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories o f All?," International Studies Quarterly 
VOL. 33, NO. 3 (September 1989): 261.
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to understand international political events better. Doing so, it is believed, will lead us as 
citizens, corporations, and world leaders to be more effective in pursuing things like 
justice, economic growth, national security, and whatever else we might need.
Remarkably, however, the above goal o f international relations already generates 
controversy among political scientists. After World War II the, so-called, 'First Debate' in 
international relations theory arose over whether theorists should embrace traditional 
, realism or the new liberalism. On the one hand, realism's concise world view easily 
focused attention on states and their power attributes. Liberalism, on the other hand, was 
better suited to addressing issues such as newly emerging cooperative world political and 
economic systems. One of the challenges of liberalism was that many of its ways of 
looking at the world could simply be seen as current problems with realism, and not any 
real new theory.14 Additionally, world leaders still behaved much as if other grass-roots or 
trans-national institutions did not exist and had no impact on their dealings.15
Not long after Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, which many herald as the 
starting point for modern international relations, and certainly the introduction o f realism 
in international relations, researchers quickly began questioning exactly who or what was 
seeking to increase power. This has become known as the 'level of analysis' question. In 
Man. the State and War, neo-realist, Kenneth Waltz elaborated on this question in his
14Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Neorealism and its 
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 344.
1501e Weaver, "The rise and fall o f the inter-paradigm debate," in International theory: positivism and beyond, ed. Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 150.
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description of his various 'images.' The focus o f the first image is on human behavior 
which is best exemplified by examination of the individual. The later images build on the 
theoretical foundation of the first in ways which then incorporate local and national 
governments and international structures.16 This work helped opened up international 
relations to a more serious consideration of the level of analysis issue.
Current international relations theory includes considerable research and discussion 
on the level of analysis issue. Everyone understands that there are international, national, 
regional, and local governing bodies which make laws and policy whose impact is felt far 
off, as well as various individuals, corporations, and organizations who engage in activities 
which play a role in international relations outcomes. Still, we understand poorly how this 
works. Additionally, basic questions such as what constitutes a level, how many are there, 
and which ones play which roles in international relations are still in need of answers.17 
Structuralism in international relations seeks to specifically address these questions. Barry 
Gills maintains that theories and research focusing on the global level negate "the myriad 
of transformative processes, be they at the local, national, or global level which are at the 
heart o f [structuralist] analysis.''18 The means by which different level actors interact 
among one another, and which levels influence international affairs under what specific
l<sKenneth N. Waltz, Man the state and war (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 119.
17Barry Buzan, "The Level o f Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered," in International Relations 
Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 201-202.
l8Ronan P. Palen and Barry Gills, Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructuralist Agenda in IR (Boulder:
Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1994), 7.
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kinds o f world events are important questions for which answers must be sought.19
Rational actor theory in social science takes the 'actor' as a central concept. International
\
relations theorists have had a generalized concept o f actors as being governments. 
Researchers are learning, however, that the picture is far more complex than that. As will 
be discussed further on, actors are the essential critical element in political science; 
figuring out who they are, and the interactions they have among themselves is a complex, 
yet critical, undertaking.
In the past, international relations research was conducted using the narrative
approach. Events and concepts were recorded in a linear story-like fashion reflecting
political events as the writer viewed them. Depending upon the researchers perspective of
an event, their understanding of the various aspects of the event, and their political or
ideological bias, the narrative was always a picture of reality as seen through the eyes of
the reporter or storyteller. Critics of narrative-based research charge that turning history
into a story with a set beginning, middle, and end goes against the nature o f history.20
Additionally, they charge that it is impossible for the narrative approach to really reflect
%
any truth since it involves the subjective selection o f data to tell the story.21 This 
distinction determines whether international relations theory is intended to be a normative 
or empirical undertaking. When value judgements are made, even including the selection
1’(Barry Buzan 1995, 213)
“ Andrew Norman, "Telling it Like it Was: Historical Narratives on their Own Terms," History and Theory VOL. 30, 
NO. 2 (1991): 126.
21(Andrew P. Norman 1991, 122)
of data, theory becomes a normative practice.22 When pure fact is reported, theory is 
thought to be empirical. This, however, will be discussed further below. Nazli Choucri 
discusses this distinction further when she writes about international relations forecasting. 
"The value-neutral posture o f science is sometimes confused with the value-driven 
imperatives o f prophecy, resulting in an undifferentiated and often methodologically 
unsound use of both theory and method."23
As the social sciences developed during the post-war period, the trend toward the 
quantitative measure of social phenomena expanded. The scientific methods and 
procedures used in the physical sciences were found to have validity in political science. 
This movement toward the use of scientific methods in international relations has become 
known as the 'Second Debate' as researchers struggle over the role o f historical and 
narrative based research methods versus scientific methods. Measurements enabling 
political scientists to understand the exact size and importance o f political events and 
institutions have become the focus of attention. While studying scientific methods, 
political scientists have recognized another important benefit offered by this approach. 
The scientific method requires a logical consistency in the construction o f theory and 
argument to accompany any quantitative research.24 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita writes, 
"No method, o f course, can substitute for good theory and good empirical research; but
^Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 142.
23Nazli Choucri, Forecasting in International Relations (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1978), 7.
24Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry. Logic, and International Relations (Columbia: University o f South Carolina 
Press, 1989), 71.
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scientific methods can make more transparent whether problems have been dealt with 
adequately or not.1,25 Often lacking in research prior to this period was a means of 
establishing logical causal relationships between events in international relations as a 
means o f predicting or explaining what happens in the world. Such features offer clear 
benefits over earlier non-empirical approaches which offer only possible conjectures for 
the future or plausible explanations for the past.
Game theory is another tool introduced to the discipline of international relations 
which is an outgrowth of the scientific method. Game theory is closely associated with 
utility theory and probability theory found in mathematics. Here, the likelihood o f political 
event outcomes can be measured by assigning probability values to different actor choices 
throughout a game.26 Models of political events can be constructed to reflect situations 
where there are two players or more, where various levels o f cooperation between players 
may or may not exist, where information may or may not be known or shared, and where 
player preferences and strategies known or not known.27 It is understood that game 
theory can only be applied in situations where actors behave in a purely rational manner, 
meaning that actors have some freedom to select among some choices to pursue the goals 
they wish to achieve.28 Political science and international relations have benefitted
25Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The Benefits of a Social-Scientific Approach to Studying International Affairs," in Explaining 
International Relations Since 1945. ed. Ngaire Woods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 72.
26James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Social Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 16.
27(James D. Morrow 1994, chapters 3-9)
28(James D. Morrow 1994, 7-8)
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tremendously from game theoretical calculations on the behavior of different actors.
Game theory models have been used to explain everything from the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor to trench warfare in World War I.29
Despite some o f these real benefits which the scientific method has brought to 
international relations theory and research, it has brought problems as well. A number of 
problems arise when applying scientific methods to social science problems. First, the 
problem with this kind of research is that it only lends itself to the observation and 
consideration of certain kinds of facts and phenomena.30 That which can be counted is 
used in political research; that which cannot is not. The purpose of a model is to simplify 
the bigger picture of reality, but models are both good and bad. While they are very 
effective tools for bringing order and simplicity to a complex world, in doing so, they 
usually lose the full texture and meaning of reality when other variables are left out.
James Morrow advises that the most important factor to consider when constructing a 
game theory model is to, "simplify, simplify, simplify."31 Doing so, however, precludes the 
thoroughness and comprehensiveness which comes with complexity. Extensive research 
during the Cold War focused on the military capabilities o f various Eastern and Western 
bloc countries, but ignored many of the domestic issues facing states. It was these 
important but unexamined domestic issues which ultimately played the crucial role in the
29Robert Axelrod, The Evolution o f Cooperation (New York: Basic Books,-Inc., 1984), 181, 75.
^Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," World Politics VOL. 29, NO. 4 
(July 1977): 507.
31(James D. Morrow 1994, 312)
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break up of the Soviet Union. Limiting the consideration and focus o f study maintains the 
logical validity of the research argument, but does not necessarily guide us to an accurate 
understanding o f international affairs. As John Lewis Gaddis writes, positivists “let 
method determine subject, with the consequences one might expect in any situation in 
which means are allowed to overshadow avowed ends.”32
A second problem encountered when employing scientific methods to answer 
political questions further involves the status of countable objects. As mentioned above, 
that which can be counted can be utilized in political research, and that which cannot is left 
unexamined. Political researchers have had a difficult time measuring subjective concepts 
like power, peace, justice, and morality. Measuring the effects o f power or peace in world 
affairs is often done, but power and peace are quite different things from the effects of 
power and peace. These concepts are some o f the most critical forces in international 
relations, and just as they are difficult to define, they are even more difficult to count.
Third, there are a number of ethical considerations as well. Since political events 
involve real people, issues o f privacy, informed consent, "subject stress," and deception 
are all real possibilities.33 As well, it is not easy to generate unbiased research criticizing 
political elites or their policies after a researcher has worked hard to gain the access to and 
trust of such individuals to procure raw data. Researchers know that political elites, who
32(John Lewis Gaddis 1992/1993, 26)
33David A. Bositis, Research Designs for Political Science: Contrivance and Demonstration in Theory and Practice 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 130.
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are often at the center of much international relations research, will be reluctant to 
cooperate in the future if they will only be damaged by the experience.34 The result is a 
strong incentive to construct data sets and infer conclusions which may or may not 
accurately reflect how the world really is.
Finally, as research into political behavior progresses on a given political event, 
unlike most objects o f observation in the physical sciences, states, world leaders, and 
interest groups often involve themselves in the research as it is going on and often change 
their political behavior based on preliminary research findings gathered during the research 
program. The result is that the behavior of the actor being studied changes as a result of 
the research being done on it.35 Figuring out what variables effect which behavior and 
why becomes increasingly difficult because a new variable (that being a political actor’s 
response to research being done on it) is introduced into the system mid-study. The well 
known problem o f the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle observed in the hard sciences can 
occur wherever scientific methods are being used, including political science. If control of 
the data is lost, the research effort will be lost. This behavior makes understanding what is 
really going on that much more difficult.
There is no resolution to the controversy arising from the application o f scientific 
method to international relations. The inadequacies of the scientific method combined
“ (David A. Bositis 1990, 131)
35(David A. Bositis 1990, 10)
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with other new influences, have created an opening for the 'Third Debate1 in international 
relations theory. Just as scientific methods swept through political science thirty years 
before, the post-modern epistemological thinking developed in other fields has spread into 
political science as well. Post-modernism's deployment in international relations theory 
has provided even more legitimacy to theorists defection from pure scientific method. 
Post-modernism "reformulates basic questions of modernist understanding in emphasizing 
not the sovereign subject, or object, but instead the historical, cultural, and linguistic 
practices in which subjects and objects (and theory and practice, facts and values) are 
constructed."36 Effectively, what this means is that the yoke o f scientific method which 
theorists have either eagerly or begrudgingly taken up loses it significance when faced with 
such constitutive challenges. While the post-modern debate is still far from over, it has 
helped open up international relations to many new perspectives.
The 'Third Debate' is based on a post-positivist construction o f international 
relations theory. Post-positivism goes beyond the pure scientific method to shape this 
method to work more meaningfully in a social science setting. New epistemological 
frameworks and methodologies allow researchers greater latitude in research efforts.
Yosef Lapid writes, "emerging from this self-imposed positivist trap,... the post-positivist 
counterpart - or counterparts - are far more accommodating in their acknowledged 
posture o f tolerance and humility."37 While post-positivism offers excitement in its more
“ Jim George, Discourses in Global Politics: A Critical fRellntroduction to International Relations (Boulder: Lynne 
Reiner Publishers, 1994), 192.
37(Yosef Lapid 1989, 246)
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inclusive approach to different perspectives, most agree that the scientific method should 
never be discarded, and, further, there is danger in going too far off course on 
questionable post-positive theoretical tangents.38/39
Currently, international relations theorists are finding much wider latitude in which 
to work than they have in the past. The theoretical challenges, however, are much greater 
as well.40 Fundamental challenges such as what constitutes fact in international relations 
(as questioned by Post-modern theorists), which sets of facts should be selected for use 
(as questioned by Third World and Feminist theorists), and what should be done with 
them (as questioned by everyone) make research a sobering task.41 International relations 
is now at a point where there are models, theories, and approaches everywhere each being 
tested and critiqued, re-conceived and re-written in hopes of finding validity, legitimacy, 
and usefulness in world events. As international relations theory grows as a discipline, 
more approaches are tried and re-worked; none are perfect. There are many challenges 
we face in the Post-Cold War era, and international relations can and should play an
38John A. Vasquez, "The Post-Positivist Debate: Restructuring Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory 
After Enlightenments Fall," in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 238.
39K. J. Holsti, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories o f All?," International Studies Quarterly 
VOL. 33, NO. 3 (September 1989): 261.
^Steve Smith, "The Self-Images o f a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory," in International 
Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 
31.
41Thomas Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations," International Studies Quarterly 
VOL. 33, NO. 3 (September 1989): 266.
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important role in living up to these challenges.42 It is reasonable to state that each theory 
or approach has certain salient features which are worthy o f respect. Efforts should be 
made to preserve and promote such features as much as possible. The foregoing is an 
outline for assisting both the narrative/historical approach and the empiricist/positivist 
approach to international relations using the rational actor model as an organizing 
structure.
Part HI - The Six Category Purpose
John Lewis Gaddis writes, "What we need now is a data base that would be 
equally relevant to the respective concerns of historians, political scientists, and policy 
makers, from which hypotheses could be constructed and tested, and on the basis o f which 
we could begin a sustained dialogue among all three groups...."43 Gaddis's archival "data 
base" concept, however, is vague and unformed. The enormous amount o f complex 
information found in any political story needs to be sorted out and organized before it can 
become a truly useful "data base." Using the social science rational actor model as a 
starting point, political life is comprised of six distinct elements. These elements include, 
the actors themselves, actor assets and liabilities, actor world-view, actor preferences,
42For further elaboration on the role o f current international relations theory on future world events see, Fred Halliday, 
"The End o f the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical Conclusions," in International 
Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 
pp 38-61.
43John Lewis Gaddis, "Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies," 
International Security VOL. 12, NO. 1 (Summer 1987): 15.
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actor relationships, and the sort of game and outcome actors realize. The six elements 
create natural categories from which all research data and variables may be derived. 
Working from a near infinite amount of political data on any subject, these six element 
categories should first be filled in to generate a complete matrix of ideas, sorted by type. 
After looking at this organization o f data, it will be easier to gain a better sense o f the big 
picture o f a larger political story. The next step for political researchers would be to select 
data and variables which they believe are most valuable to their research questions from 
within this now organized reflection of reality , and then proceed with setting up tests to 
answer their research questions.
Rational choice theory having roots in utilitarianism philosophy starts with actors 
seeking to promote happiness or maximize self-interest.44 Rational choice lends itself to a 
wide range o f epistemological starting points, and, as a result, can be used in descriptive 
or prescriptive, narrative or quantitative research designs.45 All but a few researchers can 
derive some benefit from this kind o f event data lay-out. That said, many scholars, weary 
from the struggles of trying to model political science after the physical science mold, are 
likely to regard this organizational structure with tired skepticism. Recalling Karl Popper's 
clouds and clocks metaphor, valid questions arise like whether one organizational schema 
can really be applied to all political events, and, if so, might this not lead to an ontological
^John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Mary Wamock (New York: Meridian Books, 1974), 257.
45Margaret Levi, Karen S. Cook, Jodi A. O'Brien, and Howard Faye, "Introduction: The Limits of Rationality," in The 
Limits o f Rationality, ed. Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 4.
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and methodological sameness of approach.46 Researchers should not feel bound to use the 
six category organizational structure imposed by this data base. Creating and using a 
single research structure does create the danger of reductionism and homogeneity of 
approach.47 Nevertheless, Gaddis's observation that political scientists (let alone anyone 
outside the field) can hardly understand each other is a serious and valid concern, and one 
worth working to address. The six category approach is an attempt to accomplish this 
with a minimum amount of intrusion upon the epistemological and ideological approaches 
taken by researchers.
The heuristic process of theory-making in political science involves the selection of 
relevant variables and data from whatever is available. Researchers start their research 
programs by going only on well-thought-out hunches. Personal bias, interest, and 
observation are what feed the creative mind of the theorist when asking questions, 
constructing tests to answer these questions, and choosing data for testing. In the pre­
theory stage, no variable is intrinsically more important than another. Only when a 
variable is applied to particular issues, tests, and experiments can it be demonstrated to 
have more meaning and relevance than another. Surely, Russian military expenditures are 
an important variable, but U.S. defense planners have grown equally concerned with the 
South American drug trade.48 Both can have a de-stabilizing effect on international
46Karl R. Popper, "Of Clouds and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and the Freedom o f Man," in 
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Karl R. Popper (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 210.
47(Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco 1977, 489)
48Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Assesses Future Demands of a Smaller Military Force," The Washington Post, 2 April 
1997, 6(A).
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military affairs, but for completely different reasons. Presented with a wider assortment of 
variables for study, perhaps the hostility observed by Ted Hopf toward unconventional 
perspectives will be lessened as researchers become aware of how much information 
outside the mainstream there is to choose from yet, for no good reason, has been 
ignored.49
A controlled brainstorming approach can be used to fill in these six categories with 
data to generate a thorough picture of a political event. A concerted effort should be 
made to come up with as many details as possible to be placed into each appropriate event 
category. The deliberate effort of accurately depicting a political event through carefully 
listing all conceivable variables, both seemingly relevant and irrelevant, will generate a 
clearer picture of the whole political reality then an approach which haphazardly 'ransacks 
history' for any relevant data which may happen to be apropos to a research question.50 
This organizing effort will require a great deal more work before commencing any serious 
research effort. At the same time, however, this organized collection of data may be used 
as a depository for the selection of variables for any research on that particular area. An 
infinite number o f complete variable arrangements can be derived from this structure.
Given a more completely developed organizational background, researchers will more 
easily see the overall political landscape.
49(Ted Hopf 1993, 208)
“ (John A. Vasquez 1995, 236)
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If  we wish to stop ignoring the ‘bottom rungs’ in international relations events, and 
start asking the ‘right’ questions, we will need to get as strong an understanding as 
possible o f what is going on in the world. As responsible international relations students, 
we must be accountable for our decisions on which variables and approaches we choose 
for our research. Given a more complete picture of an event, when we choose to focus 
our attention on some variables and not on others, we will become more aware we are 
doing so. One of the major issues which feminists, Third World theorists, and others have 
with main-stream international relations researchers is that they sometimes ignore certain 
issues, while having no knowledge they are even doing so. Selecting specific variables 
from among a recognized catalog should help educate researchers on their actions.
In order to fill these categories with information derived from an unabridged and 
haphazard documentation of a world political event, it is worth getting a sense how these 
categories work and what goes into them. The following is a more in-depth presentation 
of the six major elements o f a political event, what kinds of information goes into them as 
they function as a data category, and what kinds of relationships they hold to each other 
and the world.
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Part II - Six Categories of a Story
Section 1 - Actor Category
The first task facing researchers is to list all actor variables. Every actor in an 
event must first be recognized, and then cataloged into the 'Actor' database. The details of 
their various characteristics, and their relationships to one another may be considered later 
on. Questions such as how various actors will feel the impact of an international relations 
event, which actors might have some influence on effecting the outcome of such an event, 
and who has the greatest capability to influence or control an outcome all require answers 
which will be addressed as data from the other categories is taken into consideration.
Scholars recognize now that many different actors at many levels can play some 
role in international relations. Increased communication and awareness among people all 
over the world has led to greater involvement by a wider range of actors. In the 1980's, 
increased market demands by U.S. consumers coupled with the profit motivation o f 
Japanese automobile makers and electronics companies almost single-handedly shifted the 
United States trade balance from a surplus to deficit status. Neither governments nor 
government elites can the take credit or blame for making this come about. During the 
famine in Ethiopia in the mid-1980's the U.S. entertainment industry adopted this cause 
and raised public consciousness along with millions of dollars to support hunger relief 
organizations. Individual popular musicians became involved, influencing others and
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generating support for this cause.51 The fact is, other powerful U. S. actors besides the 
United States government were effectively influencing world events and essentially 
carrying out foreign policy.
In international relations currently, debate continues over the definition of'actor.' 
Kenneth Waltz does not dispute that there are other actors besides states in international 
affairs. He believes, however, that "So long as the major states are the major actors, the 
structure of international politics is defined in terms of them."52 The concept, however, of 
states being the 'major actors' is being challenged more and more by ever more powerful 
international organizations, corporations, and popular movements. There needs to be a 
certain set characteristics which political scientists can agree make up the essence of an 
actor. Many researchers wish to broaden consideration of actors to include such entities. 
Perhaps a worthwhile starting point in identifying actors would be to start with a broad 
definition. An actor should be worthy of attention if it can influence or can be influenced 
by a political event. Since this is a purposely broad data base, there is nothing wrong with 
including data deemed irrelevant by some but important by others. Those who do not 
consider non-states as entities need not select such data for their research. Generating a 
definable list of conceivable actors in political life based on a common definition o f who 
plays a role in political events can be a small first step in developing a common language 
for political scientists. Debating whether entities such as Mexican farm workers or only
51David Fricke, "Music News: Band Aid gala is summer highlight," Rolling Stone NO. 451 (4 July 1985): 9.
52Kenneth N. Waltz, "Political Structures," in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), 89.
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nation states constitute actors in international relations is like debating whether electrons 
or molecules should be the only things studied in chemistry. Both can play crucial roles, 
but under different circumstances. Ignoring one or the other makes research efforts more 
manageable, but may not generate answers that have any bearing on reality.
What exactly does this mean in real life, and why is it important? Creative, 
unhindered thinking is required to identify all those effected by a particular political event. 
It is worth remembering the old adage here that, in the great chain of [political] being, 
everything is connected. Using the example of landmine usage in Southeast Asia during 
the Vietnam War, a reasonable research question might start by asking what caused 
combatants to choose this particular means of warfare. While reasonable, this question is 
also extraordinarily complex. There are likely hundreds of actors all playing some role in 
the deployment of land mines during the war. Understandably, as research progresses on 
this subject, some actors will be found to play a more influential role than others. In order 
to start this process, however, such a question needs to be broken down into smaller, 
more manageable, components which can help researchers better understand what is really 
involved in this complex issue.
The first step is to ask who is involved. The answer to this question is not simply a 
list o f countries and leaders. A more complete list would begin to include parties such as 
American, Soviet and Chinese manufacturers of land mines (whose employment roles and 
economic well-being are directly tied to this weapon’s proliferation), foot soldiers on all
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sides o f the conflict (who were forced to cope daily with the devastating effects o f land 
mines), the families o f these soldiers (who have been forced to cope with the challenges of 
supporting injured or otherwise traumatized veterans), local political and economic leaders 
in Southeast Asia (who are now forced to figure out how to build a stable society and 
economy where a large number of individuals have physical disabilities and where the 
surrounding land is unusable because it is too dangerous to tread), local land owners 
(whose land assets have become useless because their land can no longer be cultivated, 
grazed, or lived upon).53 This list is not nearly complete, but it begins to show how many 
people really are involved in the issue of land mine usage during the Vietnam war. Such 
actors are all involved parties either preceding or subsequent to the decision. Some 
individuals were highly involved in the decision-making process, while others are nearly 
powerless by-standers, yet all play a role.
In this work feminists, Marxists, and Third World theoreticians who legitimately 
argue that mainstream theories exclude major segments o f the population will finally find a 
voice in filling in the actor category.54 The actor category of research is only concerned 
with who is involved. At this point all actors are equal since the only question is whether 
they exist. Whether actors have any significant ability to influence each other or a game 
outcome is a concern for research in other categories.
53Donovan Webster, "One Leg, One Life at a Time," The New York Times Magazine. 23 January 1994, 42.
^J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," in International Relations Theory Today, ed Ken Booth and Steve Smith 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 190.
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Beginning by asking a more manageable question like, 'who is involved,' is more 
likely to generate practical information to start a research project, than would forcing 
ourselves to confront the whole range of issues when we try to address complex 
questions. How ethnic tensions in Central Europe threaten overall world peace is a 
question we currently fail to have the capability to adequately address. The question of 
who is involved, can generate a common organizational scheme and common language 
which can help organize the way we as political scientists approach a particular story.
Once we have come up with answers to such really fundamental questions as 'who,' we 
can move on to address the other elements which fill in the six category structure. After 
all that work is done, we can then move on to start asking our real research questions with 
a better chance of finding answers.
Section 2 - Preference Category
The second requirement involved in understanding any international event consists 
o f discovering the needs and preferences o f each actor. In a world without needs, there 
would be no motivation to do anything. Put another way, without preferences (some 
might call it greed), no king would ever go to war. The actor preference category deals 
with what thing or things an actor is trying to accomplish or possess. The rational actor 
model assumes all actors have preferences which they work to attain, or problems for 
which they seek solutions. In game theory, a state of dis-equilibrium occurs when a 
player's preference is strong enough that it is willing to take action to get what it wants. 
Action taken to obtain a preferred state starts the game. The solution to these problems
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are outcomes. For example, the United States government is faced with the problem of 
assuring an enormous supply o f oil to an energy-hungry nation. One solution to this 
problem involves maintaining influence in an oil-rich region of the world (the Middle East) 
to assure a constant source o f energy to the U.S..
Preferences are actor defined. As an actor identifies shortcomings in its world, it 
searches for the means by which these shortcomings may be addressed. The decision that 
life will be better by attaining a certain preferred state is a value judgement made by each 
actor. How ah actor comes to have one preference or interest over another is an area of 
considerable research in political science. At a certain level, basic human needs must be 
met, and this will help determine actor preferences. Social and cultural structures also 
play some role.55 Beyond that, it is very difficult to be sure what an actor's preferences are 
in a given situation. Robert Keohane writes that, "self-interest is so elastic."56 One actor's 
idea of a better life is rarely the same as another actor's. Some examples o f current actor 
preferences are, independence for Ireland, a secure homeland for Jews, greater access to 
the Japanese market for American auto-makers, freedom from persecution for European 
Gypsies, foreign investment capital for Russian businesses.
Actor desires are rarely of equal importance. Actors generally find many things 
wrong with their world (this seems to be the human condition), but there are usually only
55Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory o f Preference Formation," 
American Political Science Review VOL. 81, NO. 1 (March 1987): 5.
56Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 122.
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a very small number of these things which are genuinely intolerable and in need of remedy. 
The famous game o f the ‘Prisoner's Dilemma,’ is a dilemma for the simple reason that 
each prisoner has a range of preferences. Acting on the strongest preference of avoiding a 
stay in jail altogether can actually have the opposite affect. Acting on the lesser preference 
of staying for a short period of time (compared to a long period of time) may pay off very 
well or pay off very poorly. At root, it is the actors’ preferences which drive the game. 
Israel, for example, is a vulnerable country facing many problems. It faces security 
concerns being geographically surrounded by hostile neighbors against the Mediterranean 
Sea. It faces economic concerns being an isolated industrialized nation in a relatively 
lesser developed region. It faces philosophical concerns being a non-Moslem country in 
an Islamic region of the world. And, like all countries in the mid-east, Israel must deal 
with the problem o f finding fresh water in a desert environment. In what order does Israel 
place these priorities when all are crucial to its survival? Stated otherwise, how willing 
might Israel be to go to war to maintain, for example, a traditional Hebrew way o f life, or 
a secure Jewish homeland, or a stable economy, or enough fresh water to irrigate lawns 
and wash cars on the West Bank? As social scientists, we can roughly calculate which 
preferences are most important by measuring how vigorously each is pursued.
To confuse matters further, however, we must also be aware that what an actor 
may think is important and what its actual measurable behavior reflects may be quite 
different. Behavioral observations can be misleading since researchers observing an actor 
see the acted upon choice, which may or may not be what the actor really believes is the
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greatest preference (or finest state of affairs).57 When considering an actor as large and 
diverse as the European Union, whose scope of concerns is concomitantly much broader, 
figuring out a preference hierarchy becomes that much more difficult.
The acted upon preference of an actor will have considerable bearing on its 
relationship with other actors. When one actor's interest is the same as another actor's, the 
actors may seek ways o f acting in cooperation. Alternatively, if both have a preference for 
a limited resource, there may be bitter competition for ownership. Different actors may 
also have multiple mixed preferences which can generate relationships o f conflict or 
cooperation depending upon what is at stake. For example, when the desire is simply 
chemical weapons control, chemical companies are generally supportive and 
pronouncements of cooperation common, but when further discussion moves toward the 
need to fingerprint chemicals, document production procedures, and account for the sale 
and transfer o f exact quantities, these same actors become suspicious corporate foes 
weary o f bureaucratic entanglement and industrial espionage.58 Like the proverbial chess 
game, an actor's action taken to pursue one preference, may or may not hinder or assist 
the pursuit o f another preference. With every move o f every actor linked, missteps often 
occur due to an incomplete understanding of the consequences of each action.
As one actor pursues its interest, the world changes and the effects are felt by
57Amartya Sen, "Behavior and the Concept of Preference," Economica VOL. 40, NO. 159 (August 1973): 241.
58Kathleen C. Bailey, "Problems with a Chemical Weapons Ban," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs VOL. 36, NO. 2 
(Spring 1992): 246.
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other actors. One actor's self-interest will conflict with another actor's preferences, and a 
state o f dis-equilibrium will arise. For example, a number of industrialized states got 
together in the 1980's and realized their common desire to limit easy access to chemical 
materials used to make chemical weapons. The Australia Group of industrialized nations 
began voluntarily placing controls on the commercial flow o f precursor chemicals 
throughout the world. Since these states produced most of the world's chemicals and 
served as the major trade source for them, countries needing these chemicals for a number 
of legitimate reasons had a difficult time getting them.59 While the move to curb chemical 
sales created a more difficult situation of for those seeking chemicals for weapons 
purposes, others seeking chemicals for uses such as fertilizer production and 
manufacturing found it difficult to procure them as well. While one group o f countries 
desires fewer states to have a chemical weapons capacity; another group seeking 
chemicals for various purposes wants unrestricted trade access to this important industrial 
resource.
Section 3 - Asset/Liability Category
Assuming a definitive set o f actors at work in a particular turn in an international 
relations game, each actor needs to be examined to assess its particular capabilities. The 
neostructuralist concern with the "interrelation between policies and their wider socio­
economic and ideological domestic and international setting" is not unlike the what is
59Hassan Mashhadi, "The Cost of the Chemical Weapons Convention for the Developing Countries," Disarmament 
VOL.16, NO. 1 (1993): 79.
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suggested when filling in the asset/liability category.60 Neostructuralism calls for 
consideration o f "transformative processes" at the local, national, and international level.61 
This being the case, a much more holistic review o f actors must take place. This category 
examines these ’transformative processes' to give life and depth to the actors and their 
preferences. It is these assets and liabilities which dictate what an actor can or cannot do 
in any particular international relations game.
As with the definition and identification of actors above, it is worth constructing 
some definitions o f what constitute assets and liabilities. Armed with such definitions, 
each actor's assets and liabilities may be better identified. Actor assets and liabilities in 
international relations are the tools or resources an actor uses to influence the outcome of 
a game. To be clear, the importance of different assets or liabilities to an actor in one turn 
o f a game, may not display the same importance in another game. For example, Iraq has 
been known to possess chemical weapons since the mid-1970’s. 62 Iraq used chemical 
weapons against Iran during the Iran/Iraq War. Despite documented widespread use 
against unprotected populations resulting in hundreds of casualties, this activity never 
gained significant world attention.63 Two years later, however, the mere threat o f using
“ Barry Gills & Ronan P. Palen, "The Neostructural Agenda in International Relations," in Transcending the State-Global 
Divide, ed. Ronan P. Palen and Barry Bills (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1994), 6.
“ (Gills & Palen 1994, 7)
“ Valerie Adams, Chemical Warfare. Chemical Disarmament (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 85.
“ Iranian Foreign Minister Dr. Valayati in Working Paper ft25, in The Control o f Chemical and Biological Weapons 
(CBW): Strengthening International Verification and Compliance: Conference Summary Toronto. Canada. April 4-5. 1990. 
by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Peace and 
Security, 1990), 25.
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this same asset against Israel provoked world-wide condemnation and a rush to support 
Israel.64 While amounting to little more than a footnote in history in one situation, Iraq's 
chemical weapons capability was considered a critically important major world threat in 
another situation.
The difference between assets and liabilities needs to be made clear. While both 
play a role in determining the impact an actor may have upon a particular situation, they 
do so from opposite directions. Put in rational choice terms, an asset aids an actor in 
maximizing its personal welfare, while a liability minimizes personal welfare. In any game, 
an actor will look at its liabilities to assess what it needs to do maintain or improve its lot. 
In simplest terms, from an actor's list o f liabilities will arise the preferences which may be 
perused in a game. If  an actor is successful in a game, a pre-game liability can become a 
post-game asset.
In theory, the concept of assets and liabilities is a straight-forward and important 
element in determining the course of relations between actors. In reality, however, this 
likely to be an extraordinarily complex undertaking. For example, one might think that a 
state's possession of any weapons system would be considered an asset. Certainly, the 
Soviet Union's procurement o f chemical weapons would lead one to assume that they 
were considered by military planners an asset to be obtained. Times change, however, and 
this is no longer quite so. What was once an asset, is now a liability. The Soviet Union
MJoel Brinkley, "Israel Declares Emergency; Staying Indoors Urged," The New York Times. 17 January 1991, (A)18.
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had a considerable chemical weapons capability, but in comparison to its overall strategic 
capability, chemical weapons are not that critical. Furthermore, in the current Post-Cold 
War era where the Russian government is strapped for cash, aging and toxic chemical 
stockpiles, vulnerable to domestic and international terrorism, human error, and natural 
calamity, are proving an expensive problem for Russia. In fact, U.S./Soviet negotiations 
in 1990 on the bilateral destruction of chemical weapons explored the possibility of U.S. 
funding of Soviet chemical weapons destruction. 65 While at one point such weapons were 
believed essential to Soviet national security, Russians are confronted with a changed 
picture o f reality. These negotiations illustrate how Russian leaders now view these 
weapons as a troublesome liability they would be happy to be without.
Once a clear catalog has been generated of each actor's assets and liabilities within 
an issue area, a ranking needs to be done to weigh different actors' assets against one 
another. Within this ranking we will discover that some actor assets or liabilities have 
relevance to a particular issue currently brewing in international affairs while others have 
almost none. The seemingly minor fact, for example, of who chairs the U.S. Senate 
Foreign Affairs Committee has had crucial relevance to U.S. financial support for the 
United Nations. North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms's dislike for international 
organization, in general, and the United Nations, in particular, has placed a considerable 
burden on how that organization is able to operate. Despite stated endorsements o f the
65Amy E. Smithson, "Chemicals Destruction: The Work Begins," The Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists VOL. 49, NO. 3 
(April 1993): 42.
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work done by the U. N. by U. S. administration officials, other actors within U. S. national 
leadership have been able to successfully execute a policy of lack of support. A seemingly 
minor capability (such as control o f a deliberating body's legislative agenda) o f a seemingly 
minor, though well placed, actor may often have disproportionate influence on 
international affairs.
Section 4 - World-view Category
This part o f the international relations puzzle concerns itself with the world view 
and belief systems held by an actor. This element of the data base is important because it 
explores an actor's pre-existing mind set which can help to explain why an actor behaves . 
the way it does. The assets and liabilities possessed by an actor only tell part of the story; 
actor preferences tell another part. The world-view category documents how an actor 
looks at the world, how it understands the world to operate, and how it views itself and 
how it views others.
An actor's behavior system is multi-faceted, and which facet is reflected in the 
actor's behavior depends on a number of complex factors. To illustrate some of the 
multiple outlooks arising out of a single actor consider the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament (CD). As an actor, it takes on certain responsibilities in world affairs, and 
undertakes certain activities to uphold these responsibilities. Not surprising, each member 
nation o f the Conference comes to the group with a particular world-view and 
perspective. Participants may come with strongly market-oriented, socialist, nationalist,
regionalist, religious, altruist, or even racist views. Some representatives are highly fearful 
o f war because o f their location or minority status, while other are less so. Some states 
operate within a highly theocratic society, while others more secular. All of these world­
views come together in one international organization. The behavior o f the body as a 
whole on a certain decision may reflect one perspective or another, a mix o f perspectives, 
or a perspective unique to the CD. Certainly, however, as an organization charged with 
promoting international peace, a pacific outlook by representatives is generally the 
prominent world view expressed.66
Some well known examples of actor world-views may be seen in realist and 
idealist theories. Realism and Idealism are conceptions of reality which help guide 
behavior. Perceptions such as those generated through realist or idealist thinking can help 
to determine actor preferences and behavior. For example, looking at the events leading 
to World War I, an unexpected change in Russian world-view played a major role in the 
onset o f the war. In 1908, Austria annexed the Turkish province o f Bosnia. Serbia 
reacted to this and sought support from Russia. When Germany came to the side of 
Austria, Russia backed down from supporting Serbia. At this point, Russia was feeling 
insecure having recently lost the war in the East in 1905, and having no other allies. When 
in 1914 Germany came to the side of Austria-Hungary, Germany believed that Russia 
would, again, back down from supporting Serbia. This time, Russia having recovered
“ Different states' views on the divisive issue o f chemical weapons control may be observed to contrast, yet, converge to 
support the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention. See articles by Hassan Mashhadi, Prekash Shah, Adolph Ritter von 
Wagner, and Ameka A. Azikiwe in Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations VOL. 16, NO. 1 (1993).
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from the war in 1905 and having France as an ally, did not. Changes in Russia's assets, 
engendered greater feelings of empowerment on the part o f Russia. This shift in Russia's 
world view from lesser power to greater power brought about a change in Russian foreign 
policy. Germany's failure to anticipate this change in Russian thinking is one important 
cause leading to the outbreak of World War I.67
Section 5 - Game Category
The game category seeks to model how a set of actors are arranged how they 
relate to each other across the international relations landscape. From modeling, an 
understanding is sought on the strategies used by actors to pursue their preferences. I f  
actors have been identified, their preferences identified, their assents and liabilities 
cataloged, and their world-views understood, the next thing to consider in an event data 
base is how all these complex actors come together to interact with one another. This 
category involves using mathematically-derived game theory to construct a simplified form 
of reality from which researchers can more easily understand what is going on.
In a particular turn o f a game, there will be two or more actors, each with 
different, conflicting preferences. One actor will want one thing, while another actor will 
want another. Game theoreticians have outlined a number o f models which recreate how 
a set o f actors will relate to one another. By assessing the degree of risk and the size of 
payoff* an actor is willing to take to pursue a particular outcome, one can figure out
67L. S. Stavrianos, A Global History; From Prehistory to the Present (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1988), 602.
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possible outcomes and the likelihood of such outcomes in a given game.68 Looking at 
such things as the likelihood o f success in achieving the most desired outcome over 
another lesser desired outcome, the degree of risk involved when using a particular 
strategy, the importance to an actor in attaining one outcome over another, the possibility 
that another outcome might be equally acceptable, the amount of information an actor has 
about the other and about what will happen under certain circumstances, as well as the 
prospects o f cooperation between actors can help researchers both explain and predict 
events.
Consider the example o f the government of Iraq's quest to develop a chemical 
warfare capability. When studying two among many possible individual actors, one may 
need to look at many difficult issues to construct a model between only two players. I f  the 
actors being observed are the German chemical industry and the Iraqi Ministry o f 
Agriculture, how are the two actors put together in a game? Which actor possessing 
which assets or liabilities is most able to pursue its goals under given circumstances, and 
how does it do so? Are the vast technological, material, and intellectual resources of the 
German chemical industry a relevant asset when seeking to control the flow o f precursor 
chemicals around the world? Are the Iraqi agriculture ministry's knowledge o f complex 
chemical trade issues and its strong government-wide support sufficient assets to help Iraq 
procure chemical materials to build a potent chemical weapons arsenal? These two
“ Herbert A. Simon, "A Behavior Model o f Rational Choice," in Models o f Man: Social and Rational. Herbert A. Simon 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957): 244.
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distantly related actors have different preferences and different capabilities. It is not at all 
easy to compare these two actors; it is not even easy to see the relationship between the 
them. German chemical industry, while motivated primarily by profit, is within a major 
Western industrialized state actively concerned with chemical weapons proliferation. The 
Iraqi agriculture ministry, on the other hand, closely connected to the Sadam Hussein’s 
military, has played an important role in the acquisition of chemicals to be used in chemical 
weapons. In fact, these two actors have had significant interaction in the past for both 
legitimate agricultural purposes as well as for other more questionable purposes.69 Here is 
where a simplified model can play a helpful role. The goal of research in the area of the 
game category is to identify the kinds of relationships that exist, and assess their meaning. 
With careful construction only the most germane pieces of information are made part of 
the model to help figure out what sorts of moves each player is likely to make.
The power of game theory to explain political life has made it one of the more 
promising fields in political science. Game theory modeling enables researchers to focus 
on how actors come by strategies which determine the actor's behavior. Using the Game 
category part o f the data base, researchers can better understand the probabilities of 
outcomes and sometimes even predict outcomes. Its use, however, is dependent upon an 
advanced understanding of the entire political scene which is why understanding actors, 
their preferences, and their assets and liabilities is most helpful from the start.
69John J. Fialka, "Fighting Dirty: Western Industry Sells Third World Means To Produce Poison Gas," Wall Street 
Journal. 16 March 1988, 1(A) and 22(A).
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Section 6 - Outcome Category
The outcome to a game for an actor should, with luck, reflect the original 
preference o f the actor. This outcome is the result o f an actor's efforts toward maximizing 
its self-interest. In a perfect world, each actor's preferences would eventually become the 
game outcome. In reality, o f course, since there are always at least two players, and since 
so many games are zero-sum (meaning only one player can win) actors will often fail to 
succeed and achieve their preferences. Remember that the image o f a possible new world 
order which Adolf Hitler envisioned before he set out for the conquest o f Europe was 
radically different from the reality he faced in April o f 1945.
The outcome category is a listing of potential states of reality after the different 
actors in a game have taken their respective turns. Since there are many possible turns 
one player can take in any game, even in a single turn game, let alone an iterated 
(repeated) game, many possible outcomes exist. In international relations, every game is 
essentially iterated since there is always some kind of response to every move a particular 
player makes. The world’s players rarely ever go away but must wake up the next day to 
face each other all over again.70 As a result, the number o f outcomes, in the long run, can 
be considerable. As in a chess game, the more potential outcomes there are to a game, the 
more consideration regarding what moves should be made is necessary. With a list o f 
potential outcomes, will come a similar ordered range of desired outcomes as well.
70(Robert Axelrod 1984, 12)
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P art H I - Conclusion
The six category structuring system for political events data addresses three major 
problems facing political researchers. First, it helps foster the development o f common 
ways o f thinking about political events. Second, it helps increase recognition for all kinds 
o f variables large and small. Third, it helps researchers see a larger picture of a political 
issue, wherein this fuller knowledge can help them construct better experiments and 
theories. These are briefly discussed below.
Common W ays of Thinking
The six category matrix allows a plurality o f thinking regarding philosophical 
outlook, and methodological approach. Looking at political life through an organization 
o f six categories provides a common library o f data to test and study. This organization 
will force some to acknowledge some phenomena, if only to reject them. Debate 
regarding the nature of variables will arise, but it will center on composition and relevance 
rather then its very existence. Those who are trying to explain or predict world events in 
a purely empirical sense can use the six categories, and those who build theory hoping to 
change behavior around the world in a normative, prescriptive sense can benefit as well.
A broad range o f different philosophical outlooks may accommodated as well. Realist, 
idealists, feminists, Marxists, and others are epistemologically accommodated with this 
structure, because depending on the interest of each, the focus o f their research can 
proceed in any chosen direction after using the data ordering o f the six categories as a
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starting point. The six categories do not place a value on a given variable. The researcher 
can select or reject a variable depending upon his or her perceived value of a variable or 
his or her interest in or experience with a research variable.
While this structure provides an order to the otherwise jumbled data o f real life, 
those who do use it do face some risk. On the one hand, this is good for political science 
which suffers from many schools o f thought who are unable to communicate with one 
another. On the other hand, this is bad because using a common rational epidemiological 
outlook precludes other epistemologies. A common source of data which promotes a 
common starting point and some commonality of language may be seen as reductionist.
At a very theoretical level, some researchers may bridle at this ontological monism. When 
this is the case, researchers should not feel bound to the six category way of thinking. It 
can assist in helping develop a common language o f political science, but no one likes 
being forced to speak a language foreign to them.
Equalize Actors in Political Life
The thousands o f variables at work in any international relations issue can no 
longer continue to go unrecognized and ignored; we must learn to acknowledge and deal 
with them in one way or another. Using the six category system, when a researcher 
selects certain variables at the start o f a research project, he or she will be forced to be 
more consciousous because he or she will be forced to face the whole range o f variables in 
a particular category in order to select the ones on which he or she wants to do research.
40
Without any structure for ordering data, a researcher only has to pick any variable at hand 
and not be obliged to acknowledge the whole range of existent variables. A more 
conscious and considered process for selecting variables and data to test and study forces 
researchers to think harder every step of the way. Poor data selection, means poor 
research results. Poor data selection also means researchers are more open to criticism by 
others eager to point out selection bias.
In this age o f Post-Positive heightened sensitivity to more political actors and 
details, using a structure which draws out political data from all sources in a non- 
judgmental fashion will lend more credibility to people and their problems often minimized 
or ignored in the past. As merely possible items for research and exploration on a long 
list, no variable is more important than another. Relevance is demonstrated when testing 
proves that a variable's presence causes something to happen, or that it has some kind of 
definable relationship to something else. Alone, with no referents, one piece o f data is the 
same as another. What this means for woman, minorities, Third World actors, and others 
is that they are able to take a seat beside major corporations, super-power nations, and 
world leaders. Whether these different variables have the same impact on world events, 
and whether they can play similar roles is unlikely, but they are less likely to be forgotten. 
I f  we accept the notion that Micronesian islanders are an actor in the global warming 
debate, we must come to respect their assets and liabilities, preferences, and the game they 
will play in this realm. There may be little they can do to impact events, but they are there, 
and they do have a role. Cynthia Enloe writes, “It is only by delving deeper into any
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political system, listening more attentively at its margins, that one can accurately estimate 
the powers it has taken to provide the state with the apparent stability that has permitted 
its elite to presume to speak on behalf of a coherent whole.”71 The problem rests in 
figuring out a way to hear these margins over the clamor o f the center. Taking the time to 
painstakingly list all the different voices across the spectrum can help.
Many variables are truly irrelevant, but this will never be known if we fail to even 
recognize their existence. Currently, the only way to find out the importance o f different 
data in political science is to actually use it in research and find out by trial and error if it is 
relevant or not. This can be accomplished in a more organized fashion if the variables and 
data are themselves organized. Checking through an ordered list to find out which 
variables play a role in generating a particular outcome in a political event makes more 
sense than simply testing whatever comes up that seems to make sense in no particular 
order.
Better Overall Picture
Stepping back and looking at this huge database, the dominance of one 
philosophical or political outlook will be much more difficult because we will be forced to 
recognize the immensely broad range o f actors, assets and liabilities, preferences, world 
views, and possible games played in the world. The clear involvement of all levels o f 
analysis will challenge the ways staunch realists look at the world. Alternatively, looking
71(Enloe 1996, 200)
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at the undeniably strong hand which large state actors have in shaping world events will 
challenge those who say more focus should be placed elsewhere. Creating a means by 
which researchers can all get this broad view of the world should help them have a better 
sense o f where they and their research fit in.
Most importantly, researchers on their way to selecting variables and phenomena 
on which to conduct research will be forced to recognize the existence o f a richer, more 
diverse, political world than that to which they are accustomed. This observation must 
surely influence variable selection, experiment design, and theory construction. Laying 
out the entire U. S./Soviet Cold War relationship would necessarily include data on the 
role played by, and the experience of, ordinary Russian and American citizens. Perhaps 
observations would have been made which would have given some warning about future 
events within the Soviet Union. The goal is to avoid being blind to the political turmoil 
under our noses as we stare out to space looking for the dangers beyond.
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